Professional expert directors extensively influence corporate corruption disclosure (CCD), while higher political connections may exacerbate corporate management. This study investigates the relationship between the presence of external experts on a board and CCD, as well as the moderating effect of political connections, on the positive role of legal experts in CCD. The study combines agency, resource dependence and stakeholder theories to show how resourceful directors on the board can promote corruption disclosure. Using data on listed firms in the Bangladeshi financial sector, the study analyzes 247 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2016. The results of a multiple regression analysis indicate that accounting experts, legal experts, political connections and corporate media visibility each have a positive and significant influence on CCD. Moreover, the moderating effect of political connections on the relationship between legal experts and CCD is negative and significant due to their higher political influences. The study has significant implications for corporate governance and for policies concerning the development of the economy while reducing corruption.